Case review: original report beside what the AI sees

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

While on left downwind for Runway XX at ZZZ; we were cleared for a visual approach. Weather was clear with great visibility. We had the RNAV XX approach loaded into the FMS to back up the visual. My plan was to turn base and intercept the final approach course at or outside of the final approach fix; 'ZZZZZ'; which has an altitude of 2900. When I looked at the approach plate to verify the altitude; I mistakenly looked at 'ZZZZZ1'; which has an altitude of 2160. I then set the altitude to 2100 and initiated a descent. At the same time I began to slow the airplane down to start the configuration process; so the descent was relatively slow. At approximately 2300 MSL; I began to realize that visually we appeared to be getting a little too low. I looked back at the approach plate to verify the altitude I had selected; and realized my mistake. At that same time; we received an altitude alert from ATC; and a L/G Gear Not Down warning from the airplane. I initiated a climb to 3000; then started the base turn; and joined the XX approach course outside of 'ZZZZZ'. The approach was stable the whole way; and we landed at ZZZ uneventfully. I will definitely be looking more carefully at altitudes on approach plates to make sure I have chosen the correct one.

Narrative 2

I was PM (pilot monitoring) Captain was PF (pilot flying). We were cleared for the visual approach XX. We had it backed up by the RNAV (GPS) Runway XX. PF requested a line off of ZZZZZ1 to sequence the flight plan. 2;100 was selected for the altitude.We were on a left downwind for Runway XX. Reaching 2;100 we got a CRC (Continuous Repetitive Chime); MASTER WARNING lights flash; and L/G GEAR NOT DOWN ECAM. As soon as that happened the PF immediately started a climb to 2;900 ft. As that was happening; ATC Tower gave us a low altitude alert. I acknowledge it. We continued the approach normally; with no further abnormality.

Synopsis

A319 flight crew reported while flying a visual approach descending early resulting in flight towards terrain. ATC issued a low altitude alert and the flight crew climbed to a safe altitude and continued the approach to the airport.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On Day 0 we were given an IFR clearance from STT to ZZZ as filed which included the standard instrument departure PALCO7.PALCO. Before taking the Runway 10 Tower assigned the new departure clearance runway heading with an initial climb of 2000ft which we complied with. After takeoff we were instructed to turn to a new heading of 360; climb to maintain 10;000; and then handed off to the departure frequency. After the frequency change we were given the instruction to proceed direct to FEKKO; but we heard and read back direct to PALCO; which was on our flight plan and on the departure procedure that we were initially cleared for. While climbing to 10;000ft and direct to PALCO our aircraft received RA guidance and audible monitor climb was announced. At that time I disconnected Autopilot and followed the RA guidance presented on my flight display. Around the same time of the RA guidance the departure controller queried our flight asking if we were proceeding direct to FEKKO to which we replied we were direct to PALCO. The controller informed our flight that the instruction was direct to FEKKO; not PALCO; and gave us the frequency change to Miami Center. At that time we proceeded direct to FEKKO and made the frequency change to Miami Center. After the frequency change we informed the new controller of the RA we encountered. The RA guidance was complied with and at no time did we see the other aircraft. Cause: I believe the causal factor that led to the RA was the naming convention of the two waypoints. The two waypoints have too similar of a pronunciation especially since they are both within one ATC boundary. Even though we heard the instruction given and read back to ATC what we heard; the error was not trapped.

Narrative 2

On departure after climbing to 7.000 on the heading 360 ATC cleared us to climb to 10.000ft and fly direct to position PALCO which was replied. Shortly after ATC inquired if we were flying direct to FEKKO and we replied that we where flying direct to PALCO to which ATC told us fly direct to FEKKO not PALCO. Approaching 10.000 ft ATC told us to call San Juan center. At this point we had a TCAS RA monitor vertical speed". We kept turning towards FEKKO and complied with the TCAS RA reaching 10.300ft approximately. We contacted San Juan center and advised them of the TCAS RA and that we were clear of conflict resuming 10.000ft.Cause: The position names should be phonetically more diverse to mitigate the possibility of mistaking FEKKO for PALCO. Also the use of CPDLC communication would vastly improve safety."

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported they were cleared to FEKKO but navigated toward PALCO; a similar sounding fix which was also on the flight plan.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Neither the Captain or myself have ever been into ZZZ. We were unfamiliar with the approach and airport. We referenced the company pages as well as the guide to familiarize ourselves. While on the ZZZZZ1 RNAV we were cleared to ZZZZZ 12000ft; speed assigned 230kts.We briefed and executed speed breaks 1/2 crossing ZZZZZ. We were cleaned the RNAV RNP Z rwy XX. We armed the approach and set 6500ft initially. FMA's where SPEED; FINAL APP. Brick and blue stick. Aircraft momentarily leveled at 10;600 between ZZZZZ and ZZZZZ1. Once passing ZZZZZ1 we still have 1/2 speed brakes; the aircraft began the decent for approach and accelerated to 260kts indicated. Unable to slow to gear speed; Auto pilot was disengaged by pilot flying and speed brakes full was engaged. Decent rate was decreased and speed was bled off. Reaching 230kts indicated we extended the gear. Aircraft slowed in this configuration to flaps 1; 2 speed and we configured on schedule. We crossed ZZZZZ2 6500ft; autopilot off; gear extended; flaps 2 and speed 190kts. We descended below 6500ft and received a sink Rate" alert in the flight deck. We descended to 6200ft. We received a call from ZZZ tower to check altitude. We arrested decent manually and climbed back to 6500ft. Autopilot was re- engaged. Manage speed selected and flaps 3 then full was selected on schedule. We were stabilized on approach profile at 1200ft AGL between ZZZZZ3 and ZZZZZ4 at 5700ft indicated. The remainder of the approach was uneventful and we landed successfully."

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported receiving an altitude alert from ATC during approach. Flight crew returned to safe altitude and continued to landing.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On approach to ZZZ late in arrival a bird strike occurred on runway XXR which we where set up for; the Captain pilot monitoring; input new approach ILS XYL we continued; we where vectored to intercept final and cleared approach XYL. As we intercepted in with nav armed and alt set to FAF alt of 1600 feet; descending and bleeding airspeed with air brakes to meet a 180 knot assigned speed. FO did not call for flaps soon enough and after being vectored off approach entered the heading assigned and did not retract speed brakes; aircraft had descended below assigned altitude and continued to descend as red line approached; captain noticed and retracted flaps but it was too late aircraft descended to 2100 feet and stick shaker activated. Captain took controls; called for; flaps1 and regained altitude to 2500 feet and airspeed into green at 180 assigned speed with flaps 1. Controls were given back to first officer who landed without further incident.Cause: Multiple quick instructions by ATC; and an aggressive decent profile along with the runway change led to first officer (pilot flying) not calling for flaps one soon enough. If that had occurred the altitude deviation issue would most likely not have occurred.Suggestions: First officer should have called for flaps one on approximate base position during intercept instead of relying on speed brakes to slow the aircraft; or used them in conjunction with speed brakes; this would have avoided the speed deviation/stick shaker. Then first officer would have been able to manage altitude without concern for airspeed deviation and altitude deviation would not have occurred.

Synopsis

EMB-175 First Officer reported a low airspeed condition which resulted in a stick shaker and an altitude deviation when being vectored off the final approach course. The Captain took the controls; recovered the airspeed and altitude; then returned the controls to the First Officer for landing.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Departure runway was XXL. Taxied to 1 holding point. Landing traffic crossed runway threshold and Tower told us to line up and wait Runway XXL. We had previously completed the before takeoff checklist and runway verification process and began taking position. Tower asked the landing aircraft to vacate XXL at 2; the landing aircraft stated they missed 2 and Tower instructed them to expedite to 3 for landing traffic as well as us taxiing into position and hold.Tower then instructed us for an immediate takeoff and then restated cleared for takeoff XXL. We were still taxiing into position and in and a slight right turn to the centerline.The Captain stated that I had the aircraft and began advancing takeoff power. When he selected TOGA we received a takeoff configuration warning alarm and EICAS for MAIN GEAR CONFIG; as the main gear trucks had not locked into position from the turn onto the centerline. The Captain stated reject and that he had the aircraft. I told the Tower that we had rejected on the runway. The Tower instructed the aircraft now on short final to go around.We taxied down XXL and cleared the runway on 4. We told the Tower no assistance was required. We completed all checklists via the Electronic Checklist (ECL) at Taxiway 4. Once complete we contacted Dispatch and ZZZZ Operations to brief them on the event. After discussing with Dispatch; the Dispatcher notified the supervisor.We informed Tower we were ready for takeoff; taxied to Runway XXL; completed all required checklists; checked min fuel for departure and completed a normal takeoff.Cause: Distractions and rushing pushed us to not assure the main trucks had locked for takeoff.Suggestions: Our discussion lead us to remind ourselves that once assigned a runway; in effect we have priority of it. We all felt the need/desire to do our best to help Tower and the landing aircraft on final to vacate asap. Additionally when aligning the 777 it's critical to get the plane rolling straight to assure the main trucks are locked for takeoff prior to selecting TOGA.

Narrative 2

Cleared to taxi to holding point Runway XXL via 5 and 1. All checklists completed and all engines running for short taxi. Cleared by Tower to line up and wait Runway XXL. Took note of several aircraft on final. The approach to the Runway XXL from 1 taxiway holding point is a curved taxiway approach. While lining up; it became evident that the aircraft rolling out after landing missed expected turnoff and Tower instructed them to take the next exit. At this time Tower cleared us for an immediate takeoff as we were finishing our line up. I centered the nose on centerline while continuing to roll forward as I always do. I asked the crew if everyone was ready gave the aircraft to the First Officer (FO) and began the takeoff. Power 55%. When stable selected TOGO. Rejected TO less than 20 kts. (estimate 10 kts.) with aural warning and CONFIG GEAR STEARING. FO advised Tower of reject; cleared at 4 and stopped. Completed all checklists; referred to brake cooling chart; called Dispatcher who called supervisor; advised Ramp. Continued taxi to uneventful takeoff. I was surprised at the warning as I was confident I had completed the lineup. I want to express my praise to the FO and relief FO who were excellent team players with great input.Cause: 'Immediate takeoff' instruction by Tower was a factor however I believed I had completed a proper lineup.Suggestions: Possibly; one more second of line up.

Synopsis

B777-200 flight crew reported a rejected takeoff due to receiving a main gear configuration warning on takeoff roll.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Captain was the PF. Descending via the arrival for RWY XXR; before reaching the last fix on the arrival (ZZZZZ); ATC gave us 4;000ft; I don't recall if a Heading (HDG) was also given. As we were still descending to 4 thousand feet; ATC asked if airport was in sight. The reply was affirmative and we were cleared for the visual approach RWY XXR. CA selected direct to the FAF (ZZZZZ1) and set on the altitude window 2;000 ft (instead of the published ALT of 2;900 ft) thinking that that was the published minimum altitude for that segment. We kept descending; intending to slow and configure once at 2;000 ft. before reaching ZZZZZ1. As we are descending thru 2;900 ft; sometime after; ATC issues and altitude alert. Not aware until this moment that I had set the wrong ALT; neither my error was caught by PM; We descended below the minimum altitude (2;900) to the FAF. At 2;000 ft; reacting to the ATC ALT alert; PF disconnects Autopilot (AP); Flight Director (FD); and begins a climb back to a safe altitude. Shortly after ATC advises that the minimum altitude for our position was 2;300 ft. PF leveled off then; and continued decelerating and configuring for the final segment of the approach. Cause: The causal factor for this event; was not realizing the error PF made. As I looked to the approach plate to confirmed the ALT for the FAF while descending and flying direct to ZZZZZ1; I cannot clearly state why 2;000 ft was selected. Certainly selecting direct to the FAF also caused the distance to descent to be less leading me to rush the descent. This could have been avoided by simply staying on the arrival and join from there to the approach; this would have been the best choice as it provided more time and I could have seen the altitudes in the Multi-Function Flight Display (MFD) as well.

Narrative 2

Near ZZZZZ intersection; ATC confirmed we had the field in sight and cleared us for the visual to XXR. Captain had briefed an expected visual; and we were using navigational approach data from Jepp chart; ILS XXR. I acknowledged to ATC we were cleared for the visual to RW XXR; and turned to look at the approach plate (the specific reason I do not remember); Captain quickly and firmly addressed to me we were cleared for the visual while adjusting the aircraft course direct to ZZZZZ1--within the parameters of our clearance; though it was unexpected; causing me to take a moment to consider why he cutout the other fixes before acknowledging the change to a direct to ZZZZZ1. While descending; I recognized we were lower than expected and indicated this to the Captain. I began to review the approach plate as the sight picture was to low in altitude and to distant from the airport; this is about when ATC instructed us to check our altitude as we were lower than the appropriate altitude. I checked the altitude for ZZZZZ1; which was 2900. We were at 2000. I indicated to the Captain we were too low and stated to ATC we were beginning a climb. Captain adjusted altitude and began a gradual climb; with ATC later indicating minimum altitude for our location was 2300. We were about 2400 at that time and I indicated to ATC 'we are above that altitude' (2300). Final was intercepted and altitude eventually aligned with completing the visual to a landing.Cause: I did not immediately realize the Captain changed the altitude to 2000 when he went direct to ZZZZZ1; I was ascertaining why he decided to go direct--this is; of course; when altitude limits on the original course were erased. I do not know if I unknowingly acknowledged the 2000. My actual acknowledgment was in reference to the course change; not altitude. My primary error; as pilot monitoring; was not confirming our altitude was consistent with present position and aligned with passing ZZZZZ at 2900.

Synopsis

A319 flight crew reported during the initial approach. ATC cleared them for the visual for the runway. The captain set the altitude for 2000 feet instead of the published altitude of 2900 feet and as they were descending; they received an altitude alert from ATC.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Today we flew the DSNEE 6 RNAV arrival for the ILS 20R into SNA. When verifying the points prior to descent; we noticed that the FMS would not load JWARD. We decided to query the initial Approach Controller. When we were handed off to Approach; I asked if we could expect to fly to JWARD; or if we would get vectors after DSNEE. The controller gave us the option of flying the RNAV approach from JWARD. We told him we would fly the ILS; which is what ATIS was advertising. He told us to expect radar vectors. I took that to mean expect radar vectors after DSNEE. We were later switched to our final Approach Controller. After DSNEE; we did not receive a vector and flew a 235 heading per the STAR. Before we had a chance to ask for a vector; a controller came on and informed us of a terrain alert and directed us to turn to a heading of 270 and to stop our descent. We leveled off and turned to the assigned heading. The subsequent vectors and approach were uneventful.

Narrative 2

Upon receiving the first ATIS from SNA while in cruise flight; I noticed they were using the ILS approach to 20R in lieu of the usual RNP approach; due to visibility constraints. I immediately changed the approach in the FMC to the ILS; but noticed that the last fix on the DSNEE arrival; JWARD would not load with the selection of the ILS. This was the case regardless of whether I loaded the approach with or without transitions. After multiple attempts; I conferred with the FO; we decided the best course of action was to leave the arrival as is with the ILS via SAGER transition. The plan being that we would ask the initial Approach Controller for clarification; if we were to expect final vectors from the fix DSNEE as oppose to the fix JWARD. As we checked in with the initial Approach Controller; we inquired about the issue; and he said that JWARD was the transition to the RNP; and that we would have to make that request with him. We said we wanted to do the ILS and asked if we would get radar vectors via DSNEE; he said yes. As we approached the DSNEE fix we were given a hand off; the new controller gave us a descend; but not a vector. We were experiencing moderate turbulence during this time due to fast moving weather. We continued past the DSNEE fix on a heading of 235 towards JWARD as per the arrival procedure; although not in the FMC; with the intend of staying protected and having time to ask for a vector. Before we had a chance to ask; a different controller on the same frequency said 'Aircraft X terrain alert; turn right heading 270; it looks like you're off the arrival'. I immediately disengaged the auto pilot; and made the turn. I had my ND (Navigation Display) with terrain on; and did not see any terrain closure prior to the turn. This leads me to believe that our momentary deviation from the arrival; in conjunction with our erratic descend rate due to turbulence; might have triggered the alert for the controller. We did not receive an alert on the aircraft from the EGPWS (Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System). We continued the descend; and intercepted the ILS; and landed without further incident. I believe there was a clear misunderstanding with the initial Approach Controller on what we were asking in reference to the fix vs the arrival itself. More importantly; my concern is the fact that the fix JWARD; did not load in conjunction with the ILS to Runway 20R; no matter what transition or lack thereof we selected in the FMC.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported request to ATC was misunderstood resulted in a low altitude alert and a CFTT event during approach.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

While operating as PF on flight # to EWR; I executed a go-around after receiving a low altitude alert by ATC on the RNAV W 29. We had received numerous vectors; speed; and altitude changes from ATC which made autopilot management a bit challenging on the RNAV approach. We had just been given a clearance down to 2500ft which I descended down to using LVL CHG. After crossing fix IZEKO; the IAF; the CA immediately selected 100ft in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) window without my command and didn't realize I hadn't reselected VNAV. An added pressure was that we were closing in on traffic about 4 miles ahead of us so CA advised I start slowing down and configuring which I did. Around fix PRYRR ATC issued a low altitude alert. I looked at my altitude and saw we were 700ft below our next target altitude OF 1900 at JIMLO so I then immediately clicked off the autopilot and executed a go-around as the CA communicated with ATC. We came back around and executed the RNAV W 29 once again; landing safely with no issue.

Narrative 2

During the Williamsport Arrival we were given last minute holding at PENNS waypoint at 7000 ft due to traffic saturation in EWR. We held as published for about 10 minutes and then cleared to resume arrival and handed off to New York approach. During the routine radar vectors; with step down descent clearances; and speed reductions we were expecting a clearance direct to PATRN at 3000ft then cleared for approach -- this is what previous planes received. Instead; we got direct to IZECO descend to 2500ft cleared for RNAV W runway 29 speed -- maintain 170kts until PRYRR. I was Pilot Monitoring while the first officer was pilot flying with autopilot on; and the previous MCP (Mode Control Panel) mode prior to me perceiving his selection of VNAV was Level Change. We passed IZECO at 2500ft and I then sent altitude MCP to touchdown zone -- I thought we were in VNAV. At the same time I noticed the aircraft in front of us encroaching inside 2.5 mile lateral separation ; and I thought we couldn't keep 170 knots to PRYRR with the previous planes slower speed.Around PRYRR to JIMLO ATC told us to check altitude because we appeared lower than normal profile. We both notice being below PDI path and not in VNAV -- the FMA (Flight Mode Annunicator) was indicating Level Change. We decided to go-around; and tower gave us a heading of 220 degrees and a climb to 2000ft -- I believe our altitude was 1;400ft at go-around call. We performed go around profile; and followed ATC directed instructions. The weather was day VMC and we saw EWR well before being cleared for the approach ATC vectored us around for another RNAV W 29; but this time without the altitude of 2500ft just prior to IZECO. Instead we were given direct IZECO; maintain 3000 ft; cleared for approach. We flew the approach in normal RNAV profile using Flight Manual procedures. An uneventful landing resulted with gusty wind conditions.We debriefed at gate and decided to fill out reports to share our narrative.

Synopsis

Air carrier flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during approach to EWR. Crew executed a missed approach and returned for a safe landing.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

We were cleared on the BOPAP 1C RNAV arrival to join the RNP runway 23. Approximately 35 miles from HMO ATC issued a heading of 130. We were cleared to track that heading until 25 DME from HMO and cleared to 4000. Upon approaching 25 DME ATC called again to issue direct to HO901. We turned to HO901 and remained at 4000. A few seconds later we were cleared for the RNP 23. Upon being cleared for the approach we armed the approach and FINAL APP was displayed on the PFD (primary flight display) with a VDEV indicator. We were approximately 20 miles from the airport to the northwest. We set 2800 in the altitude alert window then subsequently set 4000 for the missed approach as the aircraft captured the path. It was VFR and clear; yet we could not see the airport. We both knew it was beyond the mountain range we could see. As we continued the descent both of us agreed it did not look correct as we approach approximately 3100 ft and still well clear of the terrain. We agreed to climb up to 4000 ft. As we began our climb up ATC issued a climb to 3300. We requested 4000 and climbed up until we were certain of being clear of the terrain and rejoined the approach. The approach was normal from this point. Cause: There are multiple contributing factors and concerns with this arrival and approach. 1. There are no notes in the 10-7 regarding the possibility of being vectored off the arrival and a caution of the RNP approach resulting in a descent below MVA and surrounding terrain. The only note is for monitoring TERR; which we did. 2. I was not aware of the note in the RNAV setup stating Do Not accept a clearance direct to a fix unless it is outside the FAF. I thought this applied only to those with an RF leg. That should be emphasized on the 10-7 page as well as in training. Fix HO901 is the FAF. We should have gone to HO900 as that would have kept us clear and on the correct path. I would suggest making this note in the 10-7 and telling crews to not accept HO901 to ensure proper terrain clearance. 3. We did not reference the MVA chart. We should have as it would have improved SA. This was not a vector; the aircraft showed us on path which we followed. This is very; very similar to ZZZ issues we had in the past. The notes on the 10-7 should be changed immediately. We were fortunate it was VFR; we were very aware of the terrain as we briefed it and had TERR on. We did not simply follow the guidance but acted as if it was clearly not correct. I attached the MVA chart as a reference.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported descending on a non-published portion of an approach below the ATC assigned altitude; resulting in proximity to mountainous terrain. The crew climbed and rejoined the approach vertical profile.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Flight prior to event was uneventful. We were set up for the visual backed up by the ILS for Runway XX into ZZZ. After several very odd vectors we were vectored in very closely to the final approach fix. Due to this I (FO) decided to intercept in green needles in order to save me some task saturation while making that turn to final nearly over the fix. As we neared the intercept I realized that I no longer saw the green needles meaning that we wouldn't intercept. I quickly switched over to white needles as we passed through the final approach course and hit nav mode. I then immediately knew I had to also manually start the descent since this was turning into a white needles approach. I adjusted the altitude up and hit VS to manually start the descent. When I hit VS I also realized that we never intercepted the course and the airplane had switched to roll mode. It was at this time that I reached for the disconnect to manually fly it in and we momentarily had a stick shaker as my airspeed had been slowly bleeding off during this event as well as environmental factors of gusty winds. The captain stated 'SPEED' and I obtained manual control immediately correcting the speed and corrected onto course and PAPI's for an uneventful landing.Cause: The main cause of the event was a breakdown in visual scanning as I was focused on trying to correct our course issue after losing green needles. The contributing factors were the gusty winds as well as an over reliance on automation instead of manually taking control of the airplane when I realized something was going wrong. Suggestions: A proper scan of all of the instruments as well as making it a habit to always intercept in white needles would have prevented this event.

Narrative 2

On approach to Runway XX; we were cleared for the ILS XX and to maintain 170 knots until ZZZZZ. The FO (PF) elected to switch to green needles to intercept at ZZZZZ; but the localizer did not capture and he armed NAV mode. When the localizer still did not capture; he switched back to white needles for guidance. At this point; we flew past the final approach course and clicked off the autopilot to correct. I bugged our final approach speed of 143 knots; and a few seconds later we then received a stall shaker. I (PM) called SPEED and the FO corrected immediately. We were stable before the 1000 foot call and landed without further event.Cause: We were momentarily overwhelmed by our automation usage and did not pay attention to speed as we should have; neglecting it in our scan. I was also switching to Tower and calling out the before landing check; when I should have been adding speed to my scan and calling any deviations earlier. It was a typical windy afternoon in ZZZ; so that also could have contributed to our slow speed as well.Suggestions: We could have clicked off the autopilot sooner to be better prepared for any loss in speed. Since we were focused on multiple things at once (before landing check; radios; automation usage; and speed); we neglected the most important part -- fly the airplane and add speed to our scan.

Synopsis

CRJ-200 flight crew reported flying through the approach course and temporary loss of aircraft control.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

CA was PF and I was PM. ZZZ Approach vectored us northwest of the airport on a 080 heading. Roughly abeam the FAF; we reported the airport in sight and got cleared for the Visual Approach to RWYXXR. We had planned to fly a Visual Approach backed up with the ILS. The approach clearance came at a strange angle to final; which was exacerbated by the southerly wind. The PF disconnected the autopilot and hand flew the approach starting with a base to final turn; while we slowed and configured the aircraft. At approximately 2;300 feet; the tower controller issued a Low Altitude Alert on the tower frequency. We stopped the descent and visually verified outside and inside that we were at a safe altitude. When reestablished on the glideslope; the PF continued the approach. We were stable by 1;000 feet AGL and landed. Throughout this sequence; we maintained visual contact with the airport and all surrounding terrain and obstacles.Night visual approaches present a hazard as far as terrain and obstacles are concerned. Going forward; to prevent a scenario like this; the best options would be request vectors for the published ILS approach; or request better vectors to intercept final while under radar control before accepting an approach clearance. ATC gave us a vector that was somewhere between a downwind and base pointed away from the airport. A better vector for a base or final intercept would've avoided this situation.

Synopsis

A319 pilot reported while they were conducting a Visual Approach they received a Low Altitude Alert from Tower.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

While on the visual approach to 26R; we were cleared with an airspeed of 170 knots to OWELL. Earlier in the approach we had been advised by ATC that we would be following a Boeing 777 and to caution wake turbulence. We had encountered their wake multiple times on the downwind with some airspeed fluctuations and turbulence.At this time currently we were on a base to final turn approximately 15 miles from the runway. I was PF and hand flying the visual approach. We intercepted the glideslope and localizer around 200 knots and 4000ft and began down on the final approach to runway. We had been fully configured at flaps 30 with the gear down just past OWELL; as briefed; and began to slow up to our Final Vapp.At this time I called for Vapp and the first officer mistakenly bugged 138 knots; which was incorrect. The actual Vref was 123 knots and with an additive of 5 knots should have been 128 knots. Passing through 1000ft we made the 1000ft callouts and were approximately 160 knots and slowing. At this time we were encountering airspeed fluctuations of plus or minus 7 knots due to wake turbulence from preceding Boeing 777. Around our 500 foot gate we were approximately 145 knots with a fluctuation of about plus or minus 5 knots due to the wake and were on a stable descent path to land. And the Captain noted he was slowing the aircraft and stable. Around the 500 foot gate the FO realized he had made a mistake and told me that he had bugged in the wrong Vapp while correcting it. I proceeded to slow the aircraft to the correct speed of 128 knots. A normal landing in the touchdown zone was made and we exited off at the first high speed exit. An uneventful taxi to the gate ended the flight.It wasn't until the roll out that we realized that there was a chance that we might have exceeded the 500 ft stabilized approach criteria of Vapp plus 15 knots. By the time the FO moved the speed bug to 128 knots. I looked at saw our speed around 140 knots and thought it was still within the limits; not taking into account our previous slightly faster speed. In hindsight having to change the speed bug at the low of an altitude; should've warranted a go-around.There were several possible causes for the error setting the wrong final approach speed occurred for several reasons. The first being confirmation bias since the FO and I both usually fly the 767. An airspeed of 138kits is a typical final approach speed so it did not appear abnormal. Second would be high workload. ATC was doing training during our approach and override the primary controllers instructions. Since I was hand flying; this increased the workload of the FO. There were multiple times where we received a clearance to turn or descend on the downwind/approach; followed by an ATC supervisor correction to the radar vectors or approach clearance. Finally; fatigue likely played a factor. It was the end of a four day trip; and we had a van time of XA:55 in ZZZ local.

Narrative 2

While on the visual approach to 26R; we were cleared with an airspeed of 170 knots to OWELL. Earlier in the approach we had been advised by ATC that we would be following a Boeing 777 and to caution wake turbulence. We had encountered their wake multiple times on the downwind with some airspeed fluctuations and turbulence.At this time we were on a base to final turn approximately 15 miles from the runway. The Captain was PF and was currently hand flying the approach. We intercepted the glideslope and localizer around 200 knots and 4000ft and began down on the final approach to runway. We had been fully configured at flaps 30 with the gear down just past OWELL; as briefed; and began to slow up to our Final Vapp.At this time the Captain called for Vapp and I bugged 138 knots; which was incorrect. The actual Vref was 123 knots and with an additive of 5 knots should have been 128 knots. Passing through 1000ft we made the 1000ft callouts and were approximately 160 knots and slowing. At this time we were encountering airspeed fluctuations of plus or minus 7 knots due to wake turbulence from preceding Boeing 777. Around our 500 foot gate we were approximately 145 knots with a fluctuation of about plus or minus 5 knots due to the wake and were on a stable descent path to land. The Captain noted he was slowing the aircraft and stable. Around the 500 foot gate I realized my mistake and told the Captain I had bugged in the wrong Vapp and corrected it. He proceeded to slow the aircraft to the correct speed of 128 knots. The Captain then landed in the touchdown zone and exited off at the first high speed exit. An uneventful taxi to the gate ended the flight.It wasn't until the roll out that I realized that there was a chance that we might have exceeded the 500 ft stabilized approach criteria of plus 15 knots of Vapp. By the time I moved the speed bug to 128 knots. I looked at saw our speed around 140 knots and thought it was still within the limits; not taking into account our previous slightly faster speed. In hindsight; having to change the speed bug at that low of an altitude should've warranted a go-around.I believe my error for setting the wrong final approach speed occurred for several reasons. The first being confirmation bias. I usually fly the 767; so an airspeed of 138 looks like a logical final approach speed. Second would be high workload. It sounded like ATC was doing training during our approach. There were multiple times where we received a clearance to turn or descend on the downwind and approach and the ATC supervisor would come on and cancel a heading or approach clearance. I was also operating the MCP (Mode Control Panel); while double checking with ATC for the correct clearance; and monitoring the flight path since the PF was hand-flying. Finally; I think fatigue played a factor. It was the end of a four day trip; and we had a van time of XA:55 in ZZZ local.

Synopsis

B757 flight crew reported that they set the wrong final approach target speed on approach to IAH; citing fatigue and workload as contributing to the error.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

We arrived to the plane early and started our flows. After loading the flight plan and departure procedure during normal ground operations; we received an ATC route change via CPDLC. It was loaded; executed; and accepted together as a crew. However; due to inexperience; I did not recognize until later that this situation is when the departure procedure can be dropped from FMC flight plan. We then discussed the complex engine failure procedure at length; going over all the details for the procedure. The complex engine failure procedure included 2 fixes with 2 DME rings and radials which added more items to the nav display; so it was not apparent that the departure dropped from the FMC. Runway XXL was still on the display; and had not been dropped. The temperature was 28C with high density altitude for ground operations; which caused slower than normal engine starts; adding a bit of distraction just prior to taxi. The crew was not familiar with ZZZ and there were a few taxiway NOTAMs with closures that were discussed when planning the taxi to Runway XXL. When cleared for takeoff; winds were suddenly gusting up to 19 knots of straight crosswind of 260@15G19; which was not in the forecast; with moderate turbulence expected up to 13;000; and Aircraft Y on final that was cleared to land on Runway XXL right after we received our takeoff clearance. The Captain lined up the plane and both pilots verified the runway; and exchanged aircraft control so the FO would be pilot flying. Crew took off; checked in with ZZZ departure; and was told to climb unrestricted to FL190. Crew configured for climb on flap retraction schedule; selected VNAV; selected climb direct; and engaged the autopilot for the RNAV SID; which then followed FMC guidance directing a right turn to the next point in the FMC; which was ZZZZZ. ATC advised crew of a low altitude alert; and asked crew which SID they were assigned. Pilot monitoring responded with the ZZZZZ5; and ATC gave crew a vector of 360; which pilot flying selected. The Crew then realized the ZZZZZ5.ZZZZZ SID was dropped from the FMC prior to takeoff; and neither pilot recognized it. ATC notified crew and advised them to contact ZZZ approach. We contacted ZZZ approach after the flight; and initiated the report process.As a crew; we failed to trap the error associated with the route change clearance; as described in the AOM (attached). We discussed this error at length during the flight; realizing we had very rarely seen this situation; and the various other factors of unfamiliar airfield; weather; traffic; climb direct; and complex engine failure procedures in a high terrain environment added just enough competing factors to prevent either one of us from trapping the error. Since the runway had not been dropped from the FMC; and the addition of fixes for the complex engine failure procedure; it was not as apparent that the SID had been deleted; but neither crew member re-verified the SID constraints after the new clearance was received; only during the initial cockpit setup through the pre-flight checklist. After realizing this error; both pilots discussed adding this crosscheck to their pre-flight flow to ensure the SID is reloaded and verified after a new route clearance is received; as well as rechecking the legs page of the FMC to ensure any altitude or speed constraints associated with the SID are still programmed in the FMC immediately prior to takeoff. As the first officer; I should have reloaded the SID after the route modification; and did not recognize the situation described in the AOM. I suddenly remembered while trying to figure out how we were not on the same page as ATC. As the pilot flying; I should have recognized that the right turn to ZZZZZ directed by the FMC was too early and not at the correct altitude as the right turn to ZZZZZ in the SID. I thought it seemed off when the flight director started a right turn; but incorrectly attributed it to the climb unrestricted guidance; sincemy focus was on takeoff and aircraft configuration while flying through the wind and turbulence. As soon as we received the vector back on course; I realized my errors. I am so disappointed and embarrassed that I let a change in route clearance turn get so far off course; and not flying the SID. I should have been more familiar with the SID and not let the complex engine failure procedure overshadow normal procedures. I have reviewed the procedures with the captain; and we've discussed preventive measures and better CRM habits during high-workload environments to ensure this never happens again.

Narrative 2

While completing normal ground operations and the block out checklist procedures. The crew received a route change via CPDLC from ATC. The crew reviewed; loaded; verified; and accepted the clearance. The crew did not trap the error of the ZZZZZ5 departure dropping out of the FMC Flight plan. During the CRM/Safety Briefing; the crew discussed in detail the following threats presented with the flight. Such as; high terrain; high DA; moderate turbulence forecast up to 13;000 (not engaging the A/P at 200 AGL) to include the complex engine failure procedure departing on Rwy XXL which included 2 fixes with 2 DME rings and radials. This additional information on the Nav display may have contributed to the error not being trapped. FO/PF did an excellent job with the PF briefing. The crew discussed the threats presented.An additional distraction was during engine start; due to the high DA (Density Altitude) and temperature of 28 degrees C. The engines started very slowly. The other threats considered prior to taxi was the taxiway closures and the unfamiliar airport for the crew. The crew taxied to Rwy XXL. As the crew was cleared for T/O; the winds started gusting reported 26015G19. Also; aircraft Y was on final and cleared to land on Rwy XXL.Once lined up and Rwy verified; the crew exchanged aircraft controls and began T/O Roll with TO1 takeoff. As previously briefed; LNAV was engaged and VNAV at 1000AGL. The A/P was engaged after VNAV. On departure; PM contacted ZZZ Departure and crew was immediately directed to climb unrestricted to FL190. All occurring while; retracting flaps and getting the aircraft cleaned up on schedule. Once the A/P was engaged; the aircraft began a right turn too early; but in the same direction as the SID. This also; added a threat.ATC advised the crew of the low altitude alert and queried the crew as to which SID was assigned. Crew responded ZZZZZ5 Departure. ATC directed the crew to heading of 360 degrees. Crew immediately followed ATC instructions. Crew was notified by ATC and advised to contact ZZZ departure. Upon completion of flight; crew contacted ZZZ [Departure] as instructed and provided them with the requested information.Once at cruise altitude; crew thoroughly discussed/debriefed how the threat developed and how to mitigate the error in the future. Crew determined the error occurred with the route change during ground operations which led to the departure procedure being deleted from FMC flight plan. Unfortunately; the crew did not re-verify the SID constraints. Crew discussed ensuring to cross check; verify the SID; and any other new route clearances received.

Synopsis

B757-200 pilots reported a navigation deviation and low altitude alert from ATC after a programming error in the FMC.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On downwind leg tracking 079 for Runway XX approach of the ZZZZZ arrival past ZZZZZ1 we are given instructions to descend to 4000 and turn to heading 170. I entered the altitude and heading on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) but was late to select HDG and start a turn; Approximately 35 seconds late to select HDG. My unintentional error. Weather: CAVU - DaylightWe were in the turn to 170 when the controller issued an additional turn to 180. For the next 2 minutes the controller did a poor job of managing the situation. We followed every subsequent instruction the controller issued.What ensued next largely increased our workload and introduced unnecessary stress to the event by the controller. Throughout this event we were issued non-standard phraseology instructions; asked if we needed assistance; were given a low altitude alert at 4600' with an MVA of 4200' never told to stop our descent; just told to Turn your plane now" while we were fully established in a standard turn then given a traffic alert of a converging aircraft 2 miles; 11 O'clock and 1000' below us while in the right turn away from traffic. A very confusing set of instructions in a short period while being vectored to the airport environment was less than ideal.My First Officer (FO) stayed calm and professional throughout the whole event. He kept this situation from getting any worse. I take full responsibility for the late turn. What happened after the late turn should have been handled better by the controller. We never received any terrain alerts or traffic alerts from our instruments throughout the arrival. Only non-standard calls and instructions from the controller. Apparently the MVA altitude the controller was primarily focused on was a main factor in what escalated this event.At no point was the flight ever in an unsafe condition. I was not going to let the fact the controller issued non-standard phraseology in a stressed tone put me; my crew or my aircraft in an unsafe situation. The controller may have thought they were helping the situation but in reality made it worse. We were vectored back to an intercept heading to Runway XX and landed uneventfully.Cause: Mitigating factors on this event would include the company strategy. Failed to verify the turn."

Narrative 2

We were on radar downwind for Runway XX from the ZZZZZ RNAV STAR. ATC gave us instructions to turn to heading 170 and descend and maintain 4000 feet. I read the clearance back and ensured the correct numbers were dialed in to the heading and altitude on the Mode Control Panel (MCP) and confirmed them. I then divided my scan between looking out to the right to scan for traffic that we would be following on the visual approach to XX and cross-checked the Class B airspace diagram to ensure we would be operating at a safe altitude of 4000 feet for when we were cleared the visual approach. The controller issued us a further turn to heading 180 for the approach; and I confirmed 180 heading on the MCP; and realized that the HDG button had not initially engaged. I made an accidental mistake by not verifying that the HDG mode had engaged in the Flight Mode Annunciator; only that the number was correct in the MCP window. After starting the turn; the controller subsequently told us to continue our turn to 210. The controller then asked us if we required any assistance; which confused me; then the controller attempted to issue a Low Altitude Alert for an MVA of 4;200 and acknowledged we were at 4;600. The controller's instructions did not include the 7110.65W standard phraseology Check Your Altitude Immediately"; which did not lead me to think that we were in fact going to descend below any MVA; only that the MVA for the area ahead was soon going to be 4;200 but we would be OK because we were at 4;600; turning; and still cleared to 4;000. The controller did not tell us to stop our descent or modify the altitude part of our clearance. Per the class B diagram; 4000 is a safe altitude out to the 15 DME ring from ZZZ; which I was tracking we were in; and we have no ability in the flight deck to know where all the minimum vectoring altitudes are. Shortly after that; we were issued an alert for traffic at 11 o'clock; which further distracted my attention searching for the traffic and monitoring the right turn. The next instruction that the controller issued to us included the non-standard phraseology "Turn Your Plane Now"; which was further confusing to me as we were already in a right-hand turn. We could not safely achieve any additional bank angle in the turn without creating an unusual attitude; and the Captain did a good job of maintaining safe aircraft control and not over banking the aircraft despite the controller's non-standard instructions and heightened tone of voice. We had no alerts of anything abnormal such as a TCAS TA; or a GPWS alert throughout the pattern. We were then vectored off the approach and re-vectored back in for another intercept for Runway XX. We had no idea that there was a concern with our altitude and the MVA until the ATC said that the flight might have gotten close to the MVA. It was my accidental error as the pilot monitoring that I did not ensure that the HDG mode button press had engaged the first time to start the turn.Cause: Automation Management/Monitoring- A causal factor would have been that I verified the correct heading and altitude in the Mode Control Panel window; however I accidentally did not verify that it actually engaged. In the future; I can also point to the Flight Mode Annunciator on my Primary Flight Display to double check that the correct roll mode engages.Communication-ATC- Another causal factor would be that the ATC controller did not directly address the concern that they had in standard phraseology or even in plain english. The controller asked us if we required any assistance; which was a confusing question when everything seemed normal to us. A more straightforward way to address a developing concern might have been to say 'I don't observe a turn yet on radar; stop descent at 4;200 for Minimum Vectoring Altitude.' This could have alleviated the controller from having to issue a Low Altitude Alert.Airport Conditions- Another causal factor is the amount of traffic inboundfor landing on Runway XX. During the early phases of our descent; another aircraft asked if they could get Runway XX instead of Runway XYL; and the controller replied that there is a 5:1 ratio of aircraft inbound for Runway XX versus runway XYL; and that a runway change was not possible for them. I suspect this could have also led to controller saturation; and led to the downwind leg for XX getting 'stretched out' for the aircraft in the pattern; which potentially put aircraft further to the east during the pattern; closer to potential terrain. We were already slowed to 190 per the controller's instructions; potentially slowing the downwind aircraft to 170 could have allowed more time to react in the event that altitude and terrain became an issue.Unpublished Restrictions- Minimum Vectoring Altitude information is not readily available to pilots. According to an article about MVAs; stakeholders and other pilot unions and groups have asked the FAA to release the MVA information to pilots for situational awareness. This would be an incredibly useful tool on the flight deck; leading to an increased ability to identify and trap errors. Even if it is not feasible to incorporate this into an FMS; a chart on Jepp Flight Deck Pro app; in the reference tab; or company charts; in conjunction with the aircraft moving map symbol would be a huge increase in pilot situational awareness. Yet; since the advent of the electronic flight bag; we still have no meaningful tools on the flight deck with respect to minimum vectoring altitudes. Terrain clearance is a shared responsibility with ATC; however we have no tools to assist with this besides our Ground Proximity Warning System; which does not prevent a situation from developing such as this one. In an age where air traffic is at an all-time high and visual approaches are preferred by ATC to increase traffic volume; we have no meaningful tools to choose altitudes for visual approaches besides using altitudes on IFR approaches; which do not take into account obstacle clearance areas not on the straight-in obstacle clearance surface on a charted Instrument Approach Procedure. I think having some charts for busy terminal areas (especially those with terrain concerns) would be a very valuable tool for pilot descent planning and provide an added margin of safety to mitigate the risks of controlled flight into terrain."

Synopsis

Air carrier pilots reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC during approach.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

During rollout; Tower asked us to get off at [Taxiway] 1. We were too fast to get off at that taxiway and we missed it and coordinated with Tower to get off at 2. The airplane behind us had to go around and ZZZ Tower asked us to call them to explain why we couldn't get off at 1. I told him we were to fast and didn't have time to safely make it. Cause: Late instructions from ZZZ TOWER.

Narrative 2

Upon landing during IOE I was pilot flying; we had briefed that in this reduced flap landing; I would let the auto brakes slow the aircraft to below 30 kts. before transfer of controls to the Captain. As we were rolling out and monitoring the deceleration; Tower asked us to turn onto [Taxiway] 1. We were just prior to that taxiway and the deceleration was not complete to allow for control transfer to execute the turn off. I looked up and realized that we were passing 1. We radioed Tower that we were unable to make the 1 turn. He said to hurry down to the next exit as there was traffic on short final. We tried to be expeditious but the traffic behind us had to go around.Cause: Perhaps we could have been more expeditious in our exit; but in a training environment where configurations are dictated by trading needs; with the given spacing; I am not sure that this was avoidable. (At least by our part).Suggestions: Spacing by ATC is surely optimized for maximum arrival rate but that may not always be the solution that works for all situations. When training is involved; our performance may not be what is expected by ATC. Perhaps there is a way to alert them ahead of time to make their expectations equal our capabilities.

Synopsis

A300 flight crew reported ATC late instructions to clear runway resulted ground conflict and an aircraft having to go-around.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Upon taxi we were given [taxiway] 1; 2; 3 hold short of [runway] XXL. The first officer read back the instructions including the hold short. As we approached XXL; ATC told us to follow Aircraft Y or Aircraft Z (can't remember) from the right; monitor tower. We cleared the runway before making the turn on 3; turned the lights on to cross. We checked for traffic which we did not see; anyone on final; and began to cross. Upon reaching the middle of the runway I checked right again and noticed a landing light for XXL. At that point I noticed that there was not enough room to clear the runway due to the lineup of aircraft waiting to takeoff from runway XY. We asked ATC if the aircraft in front of us can move up so we can clear; which they did; however at that point ATC told the aircraft on XXL to go around.

Narrative 2

At ZZZ; we were cleared to taxi via 1; 2; 3 and to hold short of [Runway] XXL. I copied the instructions on a piece of paper and then read back the instructions; including the hold short detail. After the taxi instructions were read back; we proceeded to taxi along that route; and while under way; we completed the taxi/flight control checks along with the Taxi Checklist. I was performing my duties of monitoring Ground Control while running our checklists. I completed the checklist prior to entering the area of the designated hot spot between Runway XXL and Taxiway 3. We were both heads-up. Around the time of completing the checklist and going heads-up; Ground Control instructed us to follow Aircraft Y ahead and from the right and to monitor Tower. I read those instructions back. Approaching XXL on Taxiway 3; we each cleared the runway; including the final approach path in accordance with our policies and procedures. When I looked to clear the final; I did not see any aircraft. When we reached the middle of the runway we both realized that we couldn't clear it because of the traffic ahead associated with Runway XY. It was at that point that I had a feeling we were not in the correct position and that perhaps we were not in fact cleared to cross XXL. As I queried the Tower to see if they could move the plane up ahead of us; the Captain noticed a small landing light coming from Aircraft Z approaching XXL. Aircraft Z was then instructed to go around. Traffic moved ahead and we proceeded off the runway.

Synopsis

A220 flight crew reported while taxing for departure entering a runway and could not exit the runway due to aircraft on the other side of the runway resulting in ATC sending an aircraft around to avoid a collision with their aircraft.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Descending on the ZZZZZX into ZZZ. At 15000' and 250kts; was given cross ZZZZZ1 at 10000' then 250kts. The FO tried to make the restriction while slowing to 250kts. I rebugged his speed to 300Kts explaining that the speed will help him get down and we don't need the 250kts yet as the instructions were 10000'; then 250. Being high; I asked ATC for relief of 10000' and it was granted. However the FO had selected VS at -5000fpm and the speed quickly accelerated past 300Kts even with the speed brakes deployed . As the trend arrow approached over speed and speed approached 320kts; the FO disconnected the autopilot and began to pitch up to arrest the speed. In doing so I noticed the G meter activate. I commented to reduce his maneuvers and saw the meter read 1.4G and then 1.6G. My attention then went back to the PFD (Primary Flight Display) and noted the pitch at 10° nose up. This was corrected almost as soon as I saw it and I noticed the G meter extinguish out of my peripheral vision. We continued to 10000' at a normal descent and then slowed to 250kts. The rest of the flight proceeded normally.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported the First Officer pilot flying caused an overspeed and temporary loss of control while attempting to comply with a STAR crossing restriction.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On approach into ZZZ; I was pilot flying on the flight into ZZZ. Initially the metar was calling for the northerly runway but then upon listening to atis and center telling us there was significant weather on the RNAV XX final; we switched to the southerly runway. We had to change the runway and rebrief; the mountain guide was referenced while deviating from weather. Center cleared us for the approach and descend and maintain 15000. I queried the instruction from the first officer; he confirmed cleared the approach so we set the bottom altitude and armed the approach to follow the vertical guidance on the approach which had 11000 the 9400 then 8100. Since the FMS was showing us very high; I pulled speed breaks and initiated a rapid descent down. Center called us at 11000 ft to say we needed to climb back to 15000 as the MSA in the area was 14000 and called a low altitude alert. We initiated a climb to 15000 until we were given another altitude and requested vectors because we would have been very high. ATC gave the vectors. The approach and landing was continued successfully.

Narrative 2

It was leg 2 of 4 for the day. ZZZ1-ZZZ. We were descending into ZZZ and were planning on the RNAV XX approach. We loaded and briefed the descent and approach in some detail. There was weather near the field and center told us there was heavy/extreme precipitation on the final approach course. After a brief discussion; the captain and I decided to change to the ILS XY. The winds were mainly crosswinds. So we loaded the approach and briefed. Shortly after; ATC gave us a descent to 15;000 at ZZZZZ. Then he cleared us for the approach. Conditions at the time were VFR day. We were well above our descent path so the captain asked me to set 8100'; the FAF altitude on the approach. I did and they pulled open descent and extended the speed brakes. We began descending rapidly although the captain verified on the MCDU (Multipurpose Display Control Unit) that we would meet the constraints at each fix on the approach. We descended through 15;000 and ATC informed us we were below the MSA; which was 14;400 and reminded us that we should be at 15;000 at ZZZZZ. We then proceeded to climb back to 15;000. The lowest we got before we began climbing was about 11;500. We got to 15;000 just past ZZZZZ but by then we were too high for a stable approach; so we took vectors from center told us descend; and landed without further incident.

Synopsis

A319 flight crew reported a low altitude alert and CFTT event after descending below the MSA for an ILS approach. Crew climbed back and requested vectors for a second approach and landing.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

We took off from Runway 25R on the FYRBD1 Departure. We had some wake turbulence during climb-out. At 1;000 feet AGL I called for VNAV and noticed the aircraft wasn't accelerating like expected. ATC called for max forward speed then turned us off course. We discussed possible problems then my FO noticed the speed selector was in manual mode when it should have been in FMS mode. We normally rely on automation to maintain speed on departure. Once we selected FMS speed the aircraft accelerated to 210 KIAS. We expected automation to position the Flight Director (FD) to maintain the correct speed but neglected to select FMS speeds. We accidentally took off with the switch in the wrong position. I will be more careful next time.

Narrative 2

I was pilot monitoring for this flight. I completed all my flows normally and entirely. Checklist done as usual and without time pressure. We departed Runway 25R on Firebird1 Departure (not listed in procedures). 80; V1; R; V2 callouts made as usual with normal speeds. We experienced wake turbulence; NAV and VNAV callout was made; frequency change to Departure in brief amount of time. Soon after change to Departure we noticed we were not speeding up. We discussed this out loud then I realized speeds were set to manual not FMS. We switched to FMS and began to speed up as normal. Due to the slow speed; Phoenix gave us a heading off the departure then we resumed departure shortly after.Upon landing; most pilots immediately switch speeds from manual to FMS. Also; when I brief as pilot flying; I brief departing in FMS speeds;" physically touching to make sure switch in proper position; rarely finding it out of position. I was pilot monitoring for this flight and did not catch the switch being in the wrong position. In the air; distraction with radio calls and wake turbulence impacted my own response time to noticing the speed and improper switch placement.I will make sure that I add checking the FMS speed switch regardless of if I am flying or not. Complacency and lack of experience never having experienced this issue before impacted my ability to notice the issue but are easy to address for the future. I will be certain this mistake does not occur again."

Synopsis

EMB-175 flight crew reported distraction with radio calls and wake turbulence from a preceding aircraft led to the aircraft's slow acceleration during the climb; which were caused by the aircraft speeds being set to manual instead of FMS.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On approach to ZZZ we were cleared the visual approach. With the autopilot on; leave overshot final due to tailwinds. I advised the Fo; who disconnected the auto pilot to correct but he banked past 30 degrees by accident in getting back to corse. I advised him of his bank as the bank angle call came over the speaker. And he corrected back immediately. A normal landing occurred. Estimated 38-40 degrees of bank.

Synopsis

B737 pilot reported overbanking during approach resulted in a bank angle warning.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

I was the Captain and pilot flying on flight # from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. During pre-departure review; the First Officer (FO) and I noted that convective weather was forecasted at the time of our arrival in ZZZ. We discussed the associated weather threats and continued to monitor field conditions while enroute.During the flight we encountered numerous areas of moderate turbulence requiring us to change altitudes multiple times in attempt to find a more comfortable ride. Our final cruising altitude was FL240 with continuous light turbulence much of the flight. ATC advised us of holding into ZZZ. The decision was made to slow our speed and holding was lifted prior to our arrival.An hour prior to landing I set-up and briefed the ZZZZZ 2 arrival and ILS to Runway XXL; which was later assigned to us. There were two convective cells near the airport; one to the west and another to the east. Weather to the north and south was generally clear. Due to weather near the airport; ATC gave us vectors and step-down altitudes to the final approach course; which required the use of speed brakes and flaps to meet speed and altitude restrictions. We remained clear of the weather at that point; which was depicted on the radar as heavy to extreme precipitation and areas of significant turbulence. Approximately 20 miles from the airport ATC advised us that there was FOD from another aircraft on Runway XXL and changed us to Runway XXR. The FO switched the FMC programming and we both reviewed the approach differences. Approximately 5 miles prior to intercepting the final approach course and starting to level at 3000 feet with flaps 5 and speed brakes extended; ATC advised us that the winds had shifted 180 degrees and were gusty. We were asked if we wanted the ILS to Runway XYL. I made to decision to switch runways out of concern for tailwind limitations and associated issues in the event of a go-around. ATC then instructed us to turn left to an assigned heading and climb to 6000 feet. The FO input 6000 in the MCP (Mode Control Panel) and selected vertical speed +700 while I adjusted the heading. As we made the turn I observed stationary weather to the east of the airport; while also observing that the weather west of the airport was moving closer with light rain and light turbulence starting to develop. Both of us immediately recognized we weren't climbing so I disconnected the autopilot; applied power and pulled back into the Flight Director. The speed was increasing so we retracted the flaps to 1. There was still barely a positive rate of climb at which point the FO recognized the speed brakes were still extended. The speedbrakes and flaps were subsequently retracted. ATC instructed us to level at 4000 feet. I leveled the aircraft at 4000 feet and we re-cruised the FMC to 4000 at a speed below 250 knots; then reengaged the autopilot and VNAV. It took a couple attempts to reengage the autopilot as I worked to trim the aircraft. The FO then began reprogramming the FMC for ILS Runway XYL. As we came around to the south we lost sight of the airport by a wall of clouds. I could see ZZZ2; which I initially thought was ZZZ after making the turn; before realizing ZZZ was completely obscured. We requested weather conditions at the field after observing various convective radar returns in the area. While I don't recall the verbatim response; light rain was reported by the last arrival on the opposite runaway; but we were told we were the first to land from the south. ATC then gave us vectors to the final approach course. Once intercepting the final approach course the latest radar return indicated a convective cell was directly over the field. I made the decision to go-around at that point as we could not see the airport and were not receiving realtime field conditions. As I executed the go-around we entered IMC and the ride conditions deteriorated rapidly. I observed lightening to the left and front of the aircraft.By that time we were in heavy rain and moderate turbulence conditions. I immediately initiated a right turn away from the weather while simultaneously instructing the FO to advise ATC we required an immediate right turn. ATC gave us latitude to turn at our discretion and assisted with a heading away from the weather. We were in a gear-up; flaps 10 configuration at that time. While in the right turn a gust of wind lifted the left wing causing a bank angle of approximately 35 degrees; which gave us a brief bank angle alert. I corrected the bank angle without issue. As we retracted the flaps to 5 and then 1; the speed increased quickly and over-sped the flaps by approximately 15 knots. The airspeed was stabilized and we leveled off at 3000 feet as instructed on an assigned heading. Upon exiting the weather; ATC asked our intentions. We requested a hold south of the field. ATC instructed us to hold as published at ZZZZZ1; which is the Runway XYL IAF. The autopilot was reengaged; the FO reprogrammed the FMC for the hold; we established ourselves in the hold and then took a couple moments to regroup. After two turns in the hold; the weather began to clear the area. Winds were reported to be calm and we could see the airport. We then successfully completed a second approach and landing to runway XYL. Upon landing we documented the flap overspeed and contacted maintenance for a required inspection prior to our return flight. No abnormalities were noted. In debriefing this event it was clear to me that I became task saturated with pilot flying duties and command decision making responsibilities. Trying to maintain a big picture without tunnel vision in a dynamic environment while facing deteriorating weather and ride conditions became challenging. Automation management became increasingly difficult as we were monitoring the weather situation; complying with ATC instructions and continuously reprogramming the FMC. Ultimately we had four approach set-ups to three different runaways; a discontinued approach; a go-around and a hold. I credit teamwork; communication and the FO's stellar pilot monitoring skills to maintaining safety during this event. A factor that negatively contributed to this event was fatigue. While we were fit for duty; this was the second leg on day 4 of 4 of the trip. The day prior was a long duty day extended by a maintenance delay and followed by minimum rest. There was also fatigue associated with the poor ride conditions and increased workload the entire way down from ZZZ1. The combination of factors certainly contributed to delayed mental processing while executing procedures not routinely conducted. During the debrief we discussed that using LVL CHG with an appropriate speed rather than VS would have been a better option. Ensuring and verifying the speed brakes were fully retracted prior to discontinuing the first approach would have also been prudent. Also; being more deliberate on the go-around procedure; including speed management would have mitigated the risk of a flap overspeed. Finally; we discussed that if we had it to do all over again; following the first approach attempt we would have requested a hold and given ourselves more time to evaluate the most current weather conditions rather than feel pressured to beat the weather. We felt like the decision to discontinue both approaches was appropriate and noted the positive application of CRM/TEM (Threat and Error Management) in successfully completing the flight.

Synopsis

B737 Captain reported a momentary loss of aircraft control and flap overspeed after abandoning approach in convective weather. Crew landed normally after convective weather passed.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On approach to runway XX ZZZ. FO told them that he was transferring to ZZZ and has not had a lot of experience in ZZZ and asked to fly the flight. I agreed as I was based here and flown this approach many times and would help him with it. But had not been up in ZZZ for a few years and not flown the River Visual XX in a long time. Before Top of Descent we briefed the arrival and approach in a lot of detail and helped him with the visual clues and locations on the approach; Bridges; ZZZ1 and where to turn final. Approach left us high and fast on downwind; and tuned us close to the start of the visual approach on the highway bridge over the River. We were getting behind the plane and I told FO to hand fly the approach so I could set up the V-Nav and not have the V-Nav/Autopilot level us off. FO called for 'Gear down; flaps 45' and I just selected the gear down and flaps; without looking at the speed and that's when the FO thought we deployed the flaps 5 knots fast. I did not see the speed and when I did we were already below the flap speed. We did not get a flap 'clacker'. We were descending and finishing the configuration; as I looked out the window and felt that we were low. The flight director was showing us on path. At the same time we got the '1;000 feet' GPWS call out and I saw we were 1;000' low over the fix we were over. FO stopped the descent; and leveled off. All happening at the same time; ZZZ Tower told us he had a low altitude alert and I called the go-around; as trying to 'save the approach' was not a good idea. We went around and the FO and I agreed that it be best for me to fly the approach. We came around for 4th second approach and successfully landed. We were task saturated; and I was trying to mentor/teach the FO the River Visual XX; which added to my task load. I thought having the FO fly would make it easier; but actually me flying and telling the FO what I am doing verse the FO flying and telling them what to do was not a good idea.Try to not get behind the plane; and ask ATC for lower altitude sooner or start slowing instead of being 250kts abeam the airport and descending. I was not expecting to be number 1 to the airport; as I thought I saw on TCAS a plane to the north and we were to follow that plane and be number 2 for the approach. Also for selecting flaps; I need to make sure that I look at the speed before moving the flap handle.

Narrative 2

During approach on the River Visual to Runway XX; we broke 1000 feet AFL while in the descent over the river. We began well before the arrival thoroughly briefing the arrival and approach. The CA had slightly more experience with ZZZ and I as the FO had very little and had never done the River Visual Rwy XX. The set up and arrival were uneventful and we had briefed that I should follow the altitude guidance on the PFD (Primary Flight Display) as we should be in VNAV Path. As we began the approach we set the altitude to 900 feet for guidance. After crossing ZZZZZ; we noticed we were much lower and still descending. I announced I was confused as to why we were so low as we were descending through 1100 feet. At 1000 feet; the CA and I both were feeling task saturation and the CA immediately told me to arrest the descent and that we were too low. I arrested the descent and ATC informed us we were too low at the same time we immediately called for and executed a Go-Around. We informed ATC we were going around and they gave us vectors to the west in order to set up for another approach. We both then realized we were not in VNAV Path and believe that is why the altitude guidance was telling us to keep descending.Task saturation and lack of understanding of altitudes on the River Visual XX to ZZZ. Even though we thoroughly briefed the arrival and approach; we still became task saturated and confused as to why we were descending. We should definitely set hard altitudes in the FMC for each point in order to assist with altitude guidance. Also; I as PF should have been more outside in my scan and recognized that I was too low.

Synopsis

A flight crew descended below the charted altitude on a Charted Visual Approach and received a Low Altitude Alert from ATC.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

I was pilot flying on flight ABCD to IAD for approach into 1C. Approach had us at 3000ft and gave us an intercept heading of 080 for 1C; before shortly after clearing us for the visual 1C. We were backing up the approach with the ILS 1C and upon localizer capture with the Autopilot; the airplane looked to not be turning toward the approach path. At that point; the CA and pilot monitoring told me I'd have to hand fly it as it looked to be a false capture. Slightly fixated on ensuring we don't overshoot final; and being on the segment of the approach that displays 2000ft; I went to about 1700 ft before the pilot monitoring indicated the altitude deviation and I promptly began correcting. Immediately we received one aural Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) 'Pull Up' as I was correcting. After the correction; I guided the aircraft to a stable approach and landing on 1C.

Synopsis

Air carrier First Officer reported the aircraft failed to intercept the localizer while descending and they received a ground proximity warning.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

On the approach via Location A visual; due to both weather west of the field; and gusty tail winds at altitude; we found ourselves slightly high on the final segment of the approach. To reestablish landing aim point; I did push the nose over more than normal for my experiences into ZZZ as a ZZZ based pilot. This resulted in a 3 alert GPWS sink rate call out when the aircraft was sinking at 1800 ft./min. through 500 feet AGL. This was corrected prior to 300 feet but exceeds are normal SOP. Cause: While the tail winds and the weather west of the field created compression and get their -itis; and a little bit of last leg syndrome; in the future; I will go around due to the improper application of delayed descent.

Synopsis

B737-800 pilot reported a GPWS Alert on approach. The pilot corrected rate of descent and landed uneventfully.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Upon takeoff at ZZZ; we departed via the ZZZZZX departure off of Runway XXL. At 400 feet when turning via the SID to a heading of 190; we experienced moderate turbulence while in a bank and climbing with the flaps extended; leaving a narrow margin of airspeed to work with to keep the aircraft within limits. I (First Officer) while flying the SID and Turing to a heading of 220 while leveling off noticed a possible over speed of the flaps and instinctively disconnected the Autopilot via the TCS switch and pitched up to avoid a flap over speed. Given the flap setting; slow speed; and moderate turbulence fluctuating the barber poles; this induced a momentary stick shaker at which time the corrective action was taken and the Captain took over flying duties. After the event the Captain maintained flight duties to give me (First officer) an opportunity to discuss the event. During the discussion we elected to maintain flying duties as Captain pilot flying (PF) and First Officer pilot monitoring (PM) for the rest if the flight to ZZZ1. The flight continued to ZZZ1 without event.Suggestions: After reflecting on tonight's events me and the Captain discussed the importance of maintaining vigilance to airspeed not only on the high side during a rough air penetration but the slow side as well especially with fluctuations in altitude. The complexity of the departure; moderate turbulence; multiple aircraft above and below; plus a tight turn to maintain the SID all contributed to the event.

Narrative 2

Upon takeoff at ZZZ; we departed via the ZZZZZX departure from Runway XXL. At 400 feet when turning via the SID on a heading of 190; we experienced moderate turbulence while in a bank and climbing with flaps extended; leaving a narrow margin of airspeed to work with to keep aircraft within limits. The First Officer while trying to fly the SID and turn to the 220 heading while leveling off noticed a possible over speed of the flaps and instinctively pitched up to prevent said over speed. Given the flap setting and slow speed with the turbulence fluctuating the barber poles; this induced a momentary stick-shaker at which time; the corrective action was taken; and I took control of the flying duties. After said event; I maintained flying duties to give the First Officer an opportunity for us to discuss the event once at cruise. After discussion; we elected to continue duties as Captain pilot flying (PF); and First Officer; pilot monitoring (PM). The rest of said flight was uneventful and normal. Suggestions: After the said event; the First Officer and I discussed the importance of maintaining vigilance to airspeed not only on the high side while during rough air penetration; but the slow side as well; especially with fluctuations in altitude. The complexity of the departure; multiple aircraft above and below and a tight turn to maintain the SID all contributed to the said event with the moderate turbulence.

Synopsis

EMB-170 flight crew reported on departure experiencing moderate turbulence resulting in temporary loss of control of the aircraft. The flight crew regained control of the aircraft and proceeded to their destination.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

While flying inbound on the ILS XXC into ZZZ; ATC instructed us to maintain 5000ft to ZZZZZ and cleared for the approach. The VNAV Path was set at 2.0 degrees; so it showed the VNAV Path below our altitude of 5000 feet. prior to ZZZZZ; FPA (Flight Path Angle) was selected to 'chase' the path and I stated we are supposed to maintain altitude until the ZZZZZ fix. Once the aircraft started to descend below the assigned 5000ft we were queried about our altitude by ATC. ATC instructed us to climb back to 5000ft and maintain 5000ft until ZZZZZ; and cleared for the ILS XXC approach. We climbed to 5000ft; maintained 5000ft until ZZZZZ; then executed the approach with no further issues. ZZZ ILS XXC Low Altitude Alert.

Synopsis

ERJ-170 Captain reported they descended below a crossing restriction on approach and received a low altitude alert from ATC.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

While on descent on the ZZZZZ [arrival]; ATC instructed us to maintain 310 kts or better. The ride was mostly smooth but then we started to get into a little it of light chop. I was PF and keeping a close eye on the airspeed while in the descent. I was overriding the throttles to keep them at idle and as the chop began to increase; the airspeed began to fluctuate and slowly increase; turning amber. Upon seeing the airspeed slowly continue increasing; I deployed full speed brakes to assist in slowing down; to no avail with the light chop we were in. With throttles at idle; full speed brakes deployed; I engaged TCS (Touch Control Steering) and firmly pulled the control wheel back; resulting in the airspeed quickly deteriorating and the stick shaker briefly activating for approximately 2 seconds. This was due to the perhaps aggressive nature I used to prevent the airspeed from reaching the barber pole. But I was trying to avoid an overspeed event and instead activated the stick shaker. I quickly stowed the speed brakes; relieved pressure on the control wheel and airspeed returned to our 310 kts. I further reduced airspeed to less than the 300 kts and instructed my FO to advise ATC we could it do 310 kts in the descent. We continued and landed normally.

Synopsis

EMB-170 Captain reported the stick shaker activated briefly during descent due to the Captain pulling the control wheel back and resultant airspeed loss.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

I was pilot flying landing in ZZZ. The approach was stable on visual glide path into runway XX. I rotated for landing and the aircraft floated more than I had expected. Causes where potentially me starting the rotation high and the aircraft being lighter due to less passengers. I was fixating on landing and correcting what I saw developing by holding pitch or even lowering it. I touched down on the main wheels at or just beyond the last touchdown zone stripe. I began to pull the triggers and pull back to engage thrust reversers for the landing when the Captain called the go around. I hesitated to initiate it and then looked over to see if my reversers had engaged and the Captain took control of the aircraft to complete the landing.

Synopsis

ERJ 170 First Officer reported an unstable approach and long landing resulted in the Captain taking controls.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Performing the flight ZZZ1 - FLL. On the approach and landing for Runway 28L we were light weighted for landing (approximately 57.5 tons) with a Vapp speed of about 122 kt. plus a headwind of about 15 kt.; factors that made us land very short; making us between intersection J8 and J7 be at taxi speed. As there was traffic behind us we thought the best course of action would be to vacate the runway at J7 instead of continuing down the runway at taxi speed and vacate on J5 or J4.Already turning on J7 the Tower advised us to continue down and vacate the next right; but the turn was already made and it was not possible to turn back to the runway. We were instructed to hold short on the runway before Taxiway J; because there were aircraft taxiing to Runway 28L on Taxiway J. As we were still on the runway; Aircraft Z landing behind us was instructed for a go-around.Contributing factors: Low approach speed making us land very short; fatigued; low experience operating at the airport; lack of information on the chart alerting the crews that Taxiway J7 is a hotspot when operating Runway 28L for takeoff; as vacating on this taxiway conflicts with traffic taxiing to Runway 28 for takeoff on Taxiway J.Suggestions: Implementing a hotspot on Taxiway J7 alerting the risk of vacating on J7 when landing on Runway 28L and 28L being used for takeoff as there will be traffic taxiing in the opposite direction on Taxiway J.An internal safety report was made.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported landing at FLL and exiting the runway at an earlier taxiway than normal that then led to an active runway. Reporter suggested a hotspot designation.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

(The following incident occurred over approximately 1 minute and 30 seconds after departure from Newark).We were cleared for the Newark5 Departure to 2500 and to expect vectors on course. Departures at that time were from runway 22R intersection M. The FO and I reviewed the plate and discussed the threats because neither of us regularly operate out of Newark. We talked about the notes about avoiding LNAV on the company pages. Then I briefed the departure and explained that it would be hand flown using Heading Mode; we built the box accordingly with the appropriate frequency and distance ring. Performance data gave flaps 5 and due to the gusty winds we elected to conduct the max thrust takeoff procedure. Everything between the gate; taxi and takeoff was normal.We were cleared for takeoff at approximately XA:36Z. At 400' I began the left turn to 190 and we were handed off to Newark Departure (119.200). We checked in and the instructions we received were to 'turn left heading three-zero-zero; climb and maintain one-zero-thousand'. FO readback the instructions; spun the heading bug left to 300 and set the correct altitude. I verified each. At the same time we were beginning the cleanup phase but I noted to the FO that although I wasn't certain this instruction seemed non -standard so I intended to temporarily keep the flaps at 1 and the speed at 210 to help keep the turn radius tight and the climb steep. My thought was that perhaps they were planning to have us cross over the field at 10;000 similar to how LAX occasionally handles vectored departures; but I don't operate out of Newark often so I wasn't certain about this. Either way I didn't want the turn radius to be wide. This will be very relevant later.It took about 30 seconds for Newark Departure to come back on the radio and ask us why we were going left and to command an immediate right turn to heading 270 (no longer to 300; although later we would be asked to 'please keep turning' as if we just stopped out of non-compliance). This was a major startle for us in the flight deck; we were in a steep climb to the left and being told to immediately bank right. My FO spun the heading bug and I executed the turn. My gut sank out; adrenaline spiked and I became very nervous that we somehow deviated from ATC's instructions. I didn't realize it in the moment but my FO caught it and called out for me to watch my bank which was then around 45 degrees to the right. I believe the startle combined with the spike in stress of a possible deviation; loss of traffic separation or airspace excursion contributed to my over reaction. The aircraft gave the 'bank angle' call two different times during this period; as it rightly should have. A second controller (possibly a supervisor) then came over the radio and commanded us to stop our climb 'now!' and I leveled off; rolled wings level and asked the FO to set 3000' in the altitude window and hit level change. For a moment we tried to re-cage our flight deck and collect ourselves from the startle that just occurred. We had started to accelerate towards 250 knots when I noticed the speed tape and realized the flaps were still at 1 and called for 'flaps up after takeoff checklist'. I have no reason to believe we exceeded a flap speed; the speed bug never went past 250 from what either of us saw and we never heard an aural alert indicating an overspeed. It was just something that had been lost from our attention in the commotion but we finally got back to it before it became a problem.Between the two controllers we were eventually vectored back to 300 and out of their airspace. I believe the departure controllers realized they had perhaps given the wrong initial instruction and therefore never followed up with us on the issue. Either way it became very troubling for us in the flight deck because we spent the next 4 hours debriefing ourselves about our mistakes: Did we go the wrong way?What had we heard or thought we had heard?What willwe do in the future?Why did I over control the aircraft?What are the passengers thinking?How about the flight attendants?It was very embarrassing. I spoke with the flight attendants a little while later in the flight; explained what had occurred and asked if there were any injuries or concerned passengers and they said it was a little exciting for about thirty seconds but no; there were no injuries and no passengers seemed to really be concerned.

Synopsis

Air carrier Captain reported an excessive bank angle when correcting a turn from a heading deviation while climbing on a departure procedure. The pilot recovered the bank angle and followed ATC instructions and continued the flight.

Original NASA report

Narrative 1

Person A was pilot flying (PF) and Person B was pilot monitoring (PM).On the arrival into ZZZ we were being vectored for the visual to Runway XX. We were given a left turn from the downwind to a pseudo left base leg and given clearance for the visual approach XX. Upon receiving this clearance I selected 1900 feet in the altitude selector as we were outside of ZZZZZ for the next point on the approach. We were simultaneously slowing and configuring the aircraft at the time and did not notice the aircraft had descended to 1600. We received a caution obstacle" alert off of the GPWS from the Tower in line with the LOC of Runway XX. Visual contact was kept at all times and we continued the left turn to the approach course and landed safely.The primary reason behind this issue was the compression of time due to the late configuration.From my perspective; this issue began on the downwind leg. In retrospect; I would have preferred to start slowing down and configuring much earlier to prevent us from becoming overwhelmed with tasks."

Synopsis

CRJ-700 First Officer reported altitude overshoot resulted in GPWS alert and a CFTT event.